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This thesis examines the effects of war on a state’s economy.  The Liberal Theory of 
international relations maintains that there are costs to war in terms of trade; in line with this 
argument, many researchers have suggested that trading partners are less likely to war with each 
other out of a fear of disrupting their trade, which would in turn disrupt their economies.  Due to 
issues of elasticity and substitution, however, overall trade may not significantly decline during 
war.  Additionally, there are known economic costs of war, such as debt.  If war truly does have 
costs, then, it must be more in terms of costs to the national economy, rather than trade.  This 
work examines the theory that war has costs to the economies of war initiators, and samples the 
economies of war initiators from the mid-nineteenth century to the late twentieth century.  This 
paper uses a time series analysis and tests for anterior, concurrent, and posterior effects of war 
initiation on national economies, and uses a time period of up to twenty years before and after 
each war event.  The results indicate that there are, in general, no negative effects of war on a 
state’s economy: only one case had a significant negative result, while two had significant 
positive results; these two positive cases, however, also had strong evidence of autocorrelation.  
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 Many scholars have researched the relationship between trade and conflict.  While some 
have found that trade tends to increase the likelihood of conflict (see, for example, Barbieri 
1996), most have found that it is more likely to promote peace (see Haftel 2007; McDonald 
2004; Oneal and Russett 1999).  There have also been those who, though they may not have 
performed any testing in an individual work, have theorized on the subject and come down on 
one side or the other (see Angell [1909] 1933; Rosecrance 1986; Waltz 1979).  Comparatively 
few, however, have analyzed whether conflict has an effect on trade (for exceptions, see 
Anderton and Carter 2001; Barbieri and Levy 1999; and Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004).  
Most studies that have examined this topic have found that war decreases trade (Anderton and 
Carter 2001; Li and Sacko 2002; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003).  What has garnered even 
less attention in the field is whether traders (be they private actors or states) begin to reduce their 
involvement in trade when observable signs of tension may indicate that a war is on the horizon 
(one important exception to this being Long 2008). 
 There has been no research (that I have come across), however, into how strong the costs 
of war actually are.  This is an important question to analyze, as its answer is directly relevant to 
a major theory of international relations.  Liberal Theory maintains that war disrupts trade, and 
that this disruption will ultimately harm a state’s economy.  The idea behind this is that when 
State i goes to war with State j, a trading partner, each state loses a source of important resources 
and material goods, and that this sudden lack of traded goods will in turn have a negative effect 





occurring between trading partners; liberal theorists argue that this explains why trading partners 
seldom war with each other. 
 This proposition—that war has a negative effect on a state’s economy due to a decline in 
trade—has been tested by many scholars throughout the last several decades.  A major problem 
with these tests, however, is the measurement of trade.  The easiest and most common way that 
trade is analyzed in these studies is by observing the amount spent on trade.  A problem with 
this, as noted by Barbieri and Levy (1999), is that commodities prices often change in times of 
war.  Thus, an observed increase in the amount a state spends on trade may not correlate with an 
increase in actual trade, but rather higher prices for the items being traded.  So it cannot be said 
with certainty that an observed change in trade during wartime is truly a change in trade, when it 
is only measured by the amount spent. 
 In line with the Liberal Theory, however, a decline in trade will have a negative effect on 
a state’s economy.  It is also important to note that state decision makers are typically believed 
among political scholars to be rational actors and to pursue the overall success of the economies 
of their respective states, not to pick and choose specific winners or losers within their respective 
states.  Due to this belief, as well as the belief that a decline in trade will harm a state’s overall 
economy, liberal theorists expect that wars have net costs at the national level.  Therefore, a 
better way to measure a possible economic effect of war would be to look directly at a state’s 
economy, rather than attempting to make determinations based on how much a state spends on 
trade. 
 This analysis intends to observe a state’s economy to find what effects, if any, war may 





as this information is more readily available for many older cases.  As most of the literature on 
the topic of trade and conflict tends to support the liberal theory—that war has costs—I 
hypothesize that war will have a negative effect on a state’s economy.  I will only be looking at 
war initiators, as defined by the Correlates of War.  The idea behind this is that these states made 
a decision to go to war, presumably expecting that the gains they would achieve through victory 
would outweigh any costs incurred throughout the duration of the war.  The states analyzed, 
then, participated in wars of choice in that they opted for war, as opposed to those states that 
were attacked and thus forced into conflict. 
 This analysis provides a fuller understanding of the economic costs of war, and 
determines either that war has a negative effect on a state’s economy, or that war has a positive 
or nil effect on a state’s economy.  If the costs of war are found to be strong, then Liberal Theory 
would appear to be supported, whereas Liberal Theory would not be supported if the costs of war 
are found to be weak, as this would indicate that there may be low costs of war.  This analysis, 
then, obtains a more direct answer to an important question in the field of international relations. 
 Time series analysis is used to determine whether a war had a positive, a negative, or no 
effect on a state’s economy.  The model in this analysis is based on that used by Mousseau and 
Shi (1999) in their test of the Democratic Peace Theory so that the model accounts for both 
anterior and posterior effects of war.  The sample was slowly winnowed down from all war 
initiators in the Correlates of War Interstate War dataset to eleven cases.  For the time series 
model to work properly, cases were eliminated due to other wars taking place too close 





 The results of the analysis appear to indicate neither positive nor negative costs of war.  
Of the eleven cases tested, only three reached significance, and of these three, only one did not 
have strong evidence of autocorrelation.  This one case, though, did have the hypothesized 
outcome.  Finding a negative effect in only one case out of eleven, however, does not offer 
strong support for the Liberal Theory. 
 This thesis continues after this introduction first by examining past literature on the 
relationship between trade and peace (both Realist and Liberal arguments), and then discussing 
past research on the various costs of war.  Next is an explanation of the methods used in the 
study, followed by brief descriptions of each war that was ultimately included in this analysis.  






LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, & HYPOTHESIS 
Literature Review 
 Much research has been devoted to determining whether a relationship exists between 
trade and conflict.  The Liberal viewpoint—in short, that states which trade with each other are 
less likely to go to war with each other—has much more support in the literature than does the 
Realist viewpoint—that states which trade either are more likely to go to war with each other or 
are neither more nor less likely to go to war with each other.  The Liberal viewpoint rests on the 
assumption that war will disrupt trade and, in turn, the economy.  This assumption, however, has 
not been widely, if at all, tested.  Before testing, though, it will be helpful to review the literature 
on the relationship between trade and conflict. 
Realist Arguments 
 Though, as stated, much of the research on the relationship between trade and conflict has 
found that trade helps to promote peace, some scholars have theorized or found the opposite to 
be true.  Among the most well-known critics of the Liberal Trade Theory is Waltz, who 
describes interdependence as “mutual vulnerability” (Waltz 1979).  That is, in order to become 
interdependent, states must give up complete autonomy, because they are then dependent on 
resources coming in from another state.  Dorussen (1999) further explains that states prefer 
control over resources to lack thereof, and that this desire for control inevitably leads to conflict.  
Dorussen also finds that any pacifying effect trade may have decreases as the number of 
participating states increases.  Similarly, Waltz (1979) argues that states’ commitment to an 
organization decreases as membership increases, concluding then that states are better off in 





will generally have difficulty maintaining policies because each member state pursues its own 
interests when they conflict with those of the group. 
 Along similar lines, Barbieri (1996) finds empirically that interdependence has a positive 
effect on conflict.  She also observes, however, no effect on the likelihood of war.  A problem 
with her research, though, is that she did not control for major powers; later studies have done so 
and found that interdependence does reduce the likelihood of conflict and war.  She also analyzes 
only disputes and wars from 1870 through 1938, leaving any data from the post-World War II 
era unaccounted for. 
 Gasiorowski (1986), in an earlier work, attempts to differentiate between the effects of 
what he argues are the costly aspects of interdependence (such as overdependence and 
vulnerability to embargoes) and its beneficial components (such as specialization and a more 
efficient economy).  He finds that the costly aspects tend to increase the likelihood of conflict, 
whereas the beneficial components tend to decrease the likelihood of conflict.  He concludes that 
because there exist costly aspects, however, interdependence is necessarily costly and therefore 
more likely to increase conflict.  He is hopeful for the future, though, claiming that the beneficial 
components of interdependence are increasing at a faster rate than the costs, and he predicts 
therefore that this will lead to less conflict in the future. 
Liberal Arguments 
 One of the earliest theorists to posit that an increase in trade would lead to a more 
peaceful world was Angell ([1909] 1933).  His main argument is that states are better off trading 





former rather than through the latter.  He supports his claim with examples:  while conquering 
new territory may eliminate competition between countries, he writes, it does not eliminate trade 
between competing businesses; he explains that factories in Pennsylvania, for example, are in 
just as much competition with those in Massachusetts as they are with those in Canada.  In 
another argument against conquest, Angell writes that states that conquer still have all of the 
original citizenry of a defeated territory, and that these people may not be easily swayed to work 
with their new rulers.  He also observes that absorbing the population of a new territory only 
increases the burden on the state to care for its citizens. 
 Angell observes that many of his contemporaries believe that reparations will reimburse 
the victor for the cost of a war in the event that a conquering state does not absorb new territory.  
He argues, however, that indemnities in fact run on the premise that there will be a market for 
any foreign goods being imported, which, he writes, is not always the case.  He explains this 
further by writing that foreign investment only exists when there is already a market for it, and 
that there will often not be a market for a victorious state’s goods in a conquered state because 
the latter already has its own factories and products, and will not need those of another state.  In 
addition to the lack of a new market, if a state absorbs new territory after a war, it is also 
absorbing any factories that already exist in that territory, which only serves to increase 
competition within the newly enlarged country. 
 Like Angell, Rosecrance (1986) also believes that states can more cheaply obtain 
resources through trade rather than war.  He argues that nuclear weapons, especially, have made 
war too costly for any state to pursue, in both financial and human terms.  In response to those 





trade was often restricted by the implementation of tariffs in the face of economic recession in 
the decades before the war.  McDonald (2004) agrees with this point, writing that the extensive 
amount of trade in the decades before World War I was due not to an ideal of free trade, but to 
lower shipping costs resulting from technological advances. 
 Rosecrance further argues that trade allows for specialization within states—allowing the 
domestic economy to function better—a point also noted by Weede (1996).  Weede argues that, 
in addition to specialization, free trade lowers prices and helps to keep both domestic and 
international peace, whereas tariffs and other trade barriers necessarily give rise to price 
distortion and a generally weaker economy. 
 Rosecrance (1986) goes on to observe that trade also helps states to form alliances, thus 
offering greater protection against militaristic aggressors.  Though states may be generally wary 
of trade as it involves giving up complete control of their economies as outsiders are able to gain 
more influence (as noted above by Dorussen 1999 and Waltz 1979), Rosecrance writes that this 
interdependence means that states are less likely to go to war with each other out of a fear of 
disrupting their national economies.  A study by Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum (2003) supports 
this claim.  In their analysis of the Kantian Tripod (democracy, interdependence, and shared 
membership in international organizations), they find that states that are highly economically 
interdependent are roughly one-third less likely to go to war than are non-interdependent states.  
They find that interstate disputes do disrupt trade, but not usually for more than two years. 
 Furthering the argument that states want to avoid disruptions to trade, Bearce (2003) 
argues that states involved in trade groups are less likely to go to war with each other for this 





decision of whether to go to war.  He argues that states that are highly interdependent and that 
expect trade to continue at high levels are less likely to go to war with each other than if they 
expect trade levels to decline.  Copeland cites Germany on the eve of the two World Wars as an 
example, writing that war appeared to German leaders as the only remaining option to sustain 
their state.  These leaders, Copeland argues, believed that their territory did not provide enough 
resources to maintain the population, and that they had few options to obtain resources due to 
import tariffs and other powers blocking any regional expansions of German influence.  
McDonald (2009), too, writes that World War I, at least, was partly a result of internal pressures 
within Germany.  This harkens back to Angell’s ([1909] 1933) claim that states can obtain 
resources through either war or trade. 
 Bearce (2003) further hypothesizes that the frequency of meetings between state leaders 
whose states share membership in a trade organization would have a pacifying effect.  He 
applied this in an analysis of both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community 
of West African States, and his arguments were later supported empirically by Bearce and Omori 
(2005) and Haftel (2007).  But meetings between high level officials are not the only manner in 
which states interact.  Keohane and Nye (1989) and Morrow (1999) both observe that there are 
multiple levels on which states interact, including that of private actors. 
 Alternatively, Li and Reuveny (2011) find that it is not trade alone that can reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, but that such an effect is dependent upon the sector of trade in which two 
states are involved.  They argue that the reason specific imports or exports reduce the likelihood 
of conflict is due to the expectation of the aggressor that prices of traded commodities will 





prices of its exports and decrease the prices of its imports.  They note that the opposite also 
appears to be true:  that a state is less likely to favor war if it believes the conflict will cause the 
price of its imports to rise and the price of its exports to drop. 
Effects of War on Trade 
 In addition to the finding that trade increases the likelihood of conflict, Barbieri and Levy 
(1999) find that trade actually increases between enemies during times of conflict.  This would 
indicate, however, that war does not disrupt trade, thus invalidating one of the three main 
premises of the Liberal Trade Theory (Anderton and Carter, 2001).  The authors acknowledge, 
though, that they were only able to analyze seven dyads, and that the measured increase in trade 
could merely be the result of higher prices, rather than an increase in the actual amount of items 
traded.  Anderton and Carter (2001) refute the findings of Barbieri and Levy (1999).  Attempting 
to correct some of the problems they saw in the Barbieri and Levy article, they use the same 
model but make a few adjustments, such as controlling for major powers, and find in their 
analysis that trade decreases during war. 
 The debate continues in more recent studies.  Levy and Barbieri (2004) discuss the theory 
of why trade should increase during war, and they go on to provide historical examples of such.  
Reuveny (2001) determines that trade and conflict have a simultaneous relationship, each 
affecting the other, and that in many cases, conflict leads to an increase in trade.  He also finds 
differences in the trade-conflict relationship between dyads of friendly states and dyads of hostile 
states.  Later, Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) test for simultaneity bias in the Liberal 
Theory.  Their results indicate that conflict is much more likely to reduce trade than trade is to 





Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) are spurious, and proceed to present their own data showing that 
trade does reduce conflict when controlling for size and proximity.  They also find that war does 
reduce trade. 
 Li and Sacko (2002) appear to be less convinced of simultaneity arguments, noting that 
firms involved in trade between two countries are not able to predict when a war will start or 
how long it will last.  When a war begins, the authors argue, firms will expect greater risk and 
accordingly begin to limit their involvement in trade.  Kastner (2007) agrees on this point, 
writing that not only can trade with an enemy during wartime present security risks to the state, 
but that business leaders may find such trade to be excessively risky.  Li and Sacko (2002) 
further find that trade can decline ex ante or ex post, depending on firms’ expectations of the 
risks of the start, length, and duration of a conflict.  A large decrease in trade on the eve of war, 
they observe, will mean no decrease during a war; similarly, no decrease before a war means that 
there will be a decrease during war.  Long (2008), too, finds that trade does tend to decrease 
when traders expect a conflict to begin soon.  His data are a bit limited, however, as he only 
analyzes directed dyads from 1984 through 1997. 
 The majority of research devoted to the relationship between trade and conflict, then, 
finds that trade tends to have a pacifying effect, in line with the Liberal Theory.  Barbieri and 
Schneider (1999) observe that Liberal scholars tend to follow the expected utility model, but note 
that this model neglects strategic interdependence and that it assumes there is only one form of 
conflict.  These authors also write that cooperative models, taking into account the difference 
between the payoff for one state and that of its partner, ought to be examined when discussing 





trade and conflict, Mansfield and Pollins (2001) write that a sufficient theoretical framework is 
generally lacking.  Perhaps a better way to analyze the effect war may have on trade, though, 
would be to take a closer look at the costs of war.  An analysis of the effects that war may have 
on a state’s economy would be a good way to discover more about the costs associated with war, 
and thus find whether the costs are, in fact, significant enough to deter a state from going to war, 
as liberal theorists would argue.  It would be helpful to the field to give more attention to this 
topic, as it would provide a better understanding of the full relationship between trade and 
conflict. 
Theoretical Framework 
How Trade Starts 
 Trade starts largely because businesses in one state want to trade with businesses in 
another state.  They want to trade not only to gain a larger market in which to sell their own 
products, but also so they can buy items that they cannot currently buy and sell those to the 
people in their own countries.  Open trade, then, allows businesses to more easily sell their 
products abroad, as well as buy foreign products. 
 States would want to trade in order to improve the economy.  Besides bringing in outside 
products, trade also tends to attract foreign direct investment (Haftel 2007).  Another reason for 
states to pursue open trade may be so that state leaders can secure their own reelections—if there 
is an exogenous shock to the economy, leaders of states involved in trade can claim that it is 






Why Trade Leads to Peace:  Costs of War 
 There are several ways to measure potential costs of war, but there are problems with 
each (Smith 2014).  As Smith (2014) points out, some methods of measurement are subject to 
researcher bias (e.g., cost-benefit analysis can be measured in a variety of ways), while other 
methods are subject to data availability (e.g., not all states accurately or publicly report defense 
spending). 
 Liberal Trade Theory, however, argues that the main cost of war is the disruption to any 
economic gains achieved through trade (Anderton and Carter 2001).  It can be inferred from this 
that states at war with each other would generally have lower levels of trade interdependence, an 
inference that has been supported empirically (see, for example, Anderton and Carter 2001; 
Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Li and Sacko 2002; Reuveny 2001). 
 Some traded resources, however, are more elastic than others.  That is, a state can go 
without certain imports or industries or even replace them with others.  Bananas are an example 
of an elastic commodity, because people can typically survive without bananas.  Gasoline, 
however, is less elastic, in that it is generally more difficult (though of course not impossible) to 
go without.  And so in times of war, a state can more easily substitute elastic resources, or 
perhaps even find another seller for resources both elastic and inelastic. 
 If one state is substituting some resources for others or is substituting resources from one 
state with those of another, however, there may not be an observable change in trade during 
wartime.  That is, while trade may be more limited with an enemy, specifically, during wartime, 
perhaps trade overall increases or remains level due to receiving imports from a new state.  





are at war, these researchers only analyze large scale wars—specifically, the two World Wars.  
They note that the neutral states suffered this decline due to the fact that the warring states were 
much larger than those that remained neutral, and these warring states were among the largest 
trade partners of these neutral states.  Although substitution may not have come into play during 
the two World Wars, it would not be fair to assume without further examination that this is the 
same for all wars.  Additionally, conflict may increase prices of imports and exports (Li and 
Reuveny 2011).  An observable change in spending on trade during conflict, then, may not 
necessarily mean that there is more or less being traded, but rather only that prices have changed.  
Any costs associated with war, then, may be more visible in effects on the economy, generally, 
rather than in effects on trade, specifically. 
 It is commonly accepted that there are, in fact, economic costs of war, such as debt or 
changes in GDP per capita (Angell [1909] 1933; Rosecrance 1986).  Trading partners are more 
likely to be peaceful out of a fear of these costs and of disrupting their trade (Bearce 2003).  It is 
generally assumed that conflict makes trade both more difficult and more costly, due to tariffs, 
embargoes, and other measures that restrict free trade (Polachek 1980).  Aside from allowing 
states to obtain resources more cheaply, trade also allows for specialization within states, which 
provides for an improved economy (Rosecrance 1986).  And it is the economy that states do not 
want to risk weakening by going to war (Rosecrance 1986). 
 What all of this comes to, then, is that due to elasticity, substitution, and price variability, 
it can be difficult to accurately analyze any subtle changes in trade that may occur during 





rather than on its trade.  This thesis, then, will take a new approach to examine the Liberal Thesis 
that war has costs to the economies of the nations that start them. 
Hypothesis 
 Based on the predominance of the empirical work supporting the Liberal Theory, it is 
reasonable to expect that that there are indeed costs associated with war.  Though dyads may 
have low levels of interdependence between themselves during wartime, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that they will find substitutes either for specific imports or for their former trade partners.  
So, as stated above, it is likely that costs associated with war will be observable more so in 
changes in a state’s GDP than in changes in a state’s levels of trade. 
Hypothesis:  War has a negative effect on a state’s economy. 
 The null hypothesis, then, is that war has no effect on a state’s economy.  This can 







Definitions and Datasets 
 Cost is measured in this thesis in terms of energy consumption aggregated annually, with 
energy consumption used as a proxy for GNP, as discussed by Lewis-Beck (1986).  For testing, I 
obtained information from the Inter-State War Dataset, developed by Sarkees and Wyman 
(2010), from the Correlates of War, containing data on wars taking place between or among 
states from 1816 through 2007, as well as that National Material Capabilities Dataset, originally 
developed by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), providing data on energy consumption, as 
well as on other variables.  I used Version 4 of this dataset.  The energy consumption variable in 
this dataset is labelled “Primary Energy Consumption,” and is formulated as 
 Consumption = Production + Imports – Exports – Δ in Domestic Stocks 
Primary Energy Consumption is computed using data on commercial, or industrial, energy (e.g., 
coal, natural gas, electricity, and petroleum), converted into one thousand metric ton coal 
equivalents and added together to determine the energy consumption for a particular state and a 
particular year.  For further information on the computation of Primary Energy Consumption, see 
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). 
Testing 
 I use an interrupted time-series model, fashioned after that used by Mousseau and Shi 
(1999) in their test of whether democracy declined in the time leading up to conflict.  The 
dependent variable in my study is “cost” time-series at the national level.  There are two 





and one to measure a shift in cost after a war (shock effect).  The level effect is used here to 
measure the expected decline in cost leading up to a war, and the shock effect is used to measure 
the expected return to pre-war cost levels.  Level is coded 0 for all observations before a war and 
1 for all observations after that point.  Similarly, Shock is coded 1 for observations between the 
shift point and the end of war, and 0 for observations both before and after war.  There is a 
chance for measurement error if cost increases to pre-war levels sometime after a war ends (other 
than immediately), but this error must be assumed to be random. 
 I also include a third variable to control for the trend of cost across time.  That is to say, 
perhaps cost would have increased or decreased regardless of war, so merely seeing a change in 
cost after a war would be misleading.  A count variable called “time” is used, then, to control for 
the trend in cost regardless of war by taking into account the fact that cost may shift for other 
reasons. 
 A formal expression of the model I estimate is: 
 Yt = β0 + β1Levelt + β2Shockt + β3Time, t = 1, 2, . . .    (1) 
where Y is the cost at time t. 
 Additional dummy variables—“measdum,” “measdum2,” and “measdum3”—were used 
as needed to control for changes in the measurement of cost in the original source material.  
Between the 1950s and 1970, for example, the coders switched their measurement of energy 
consumption from B. R. Mitchel’s International Historical Statistics to the United Nations 
Energy Statistics Database (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), and so the year of the change 





were coded as 0.  For greater detail, please see Appendix B.  Similarly, there were changes in the 
measurement within either the Mitchel data or the UN data; additional measurement dummies 
were used to control for these changes, as well.  I accounted for “normal” cost by including 
energy consumption data from up to twenty years before and up to twenty years after each war 
event.  Many cases were eliminated due to a lack of data for a full twenty years; this is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
Case Selection 
 As I am only analyzing the effects of war on the initiator—I am only studying wars of 
choice—all non-initiator states involved in a particular war were eliminated from the study.  
There was discussion of including allies of initiators, but this idea was ultimately rejected, as not 
all states joined the initiator out of a desire to assist the initiator; France, for example, is coded as 
an ally of Germany during several years of World War II—the years of occupation. 
 Because it would be difficult to judge any changes in cost for a state going to war soon 
after gaining independence, all war events beginning within the first ten years of a state’s 
independence—or the beginning of the data records for any other reason—were omitted.  For 
example, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 is excluded because it began just two years after Jordan 
(coded as the initiator) gained independence, and the Franco-Spanish War of 1823 is excluded 
because it began just seven year after the first year of available data.  Similarly, because the data 
end in 2007, all wars ending after 1997, such as the War for Kosovo in 1999, were eliminated.  
Cases were also eliminated if the initiator ceased to exist within ten years after the end of the 





 There were several cases with missing energy consumption data, or with energy 
consumption recorded as “0” for several consecutive years within the time period to be analyzed; 
these cases were removed as well.  The Chaco War of 1932-1935, for example, was eliminated 
because there is no energy consumption data for the initiator, Bolivia, until five years before the 
war, and the Lopez War of 1864-1870 was eliminated because there is no energy consumption 
data for Paraguay for the four years immediately following the war. 
 I also excluded a war if the initiator was involved in any other war within the measured 
pre- or post-war period.  That is, any war event occurring within the anterior and posterior 
periods of a war event of study led to the exclusion of that particular case.  The Assam War, for 
example, is eliminated due to the Second World War, the Korean War, the Off-Shore Islands 
War, and the Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War each occurring within the time period of study. 
Limitations and Key Assumptions 
 Due to the eliminations made during the case selection process, I was left with a 
relatively small sample size of 11 cases.  These are also generally short wars—only two of the 
wars analyzed lasted over a year, and neither of these lasted more than seventeen months.  There 
is no overtly apparent problem in selection effects, as states included in the sample are those that 
went to war, and it can be said with certainty that states involved in a war were ultimately not 
deterred by potential costs. 
Contribution to Literature 
 As mentioned above, many researchers have assumed that there are costs associated with 





associated with costs, however, is important to understand, as it is directly relevant to a major 
theory of international relations.  If the costs of war are found to be strong, then the Liberal 
Theory would appear to be supported.  If, on the other hand, the costs of war are found to be 
weak, then there may be little cost to war and the Liberal Theory would not be supported.  This 
analysis, then, shall answer an important question that has so far been missing from the broader 






DESCRIPTIONS OF WARS 
Cenepa Valley War 
 The border between Ecuador and Peru had been disputed by the two states for most of 
their post-independence histories, and the two had had several minor military conflicts, though 
most of these had relatively few casualties.  Peru invaded Ecuador in 1941, leading to the 1942 
Rio Protocol, which delineated almost the entire border in the plains region.  Ecuador, however, 
refused to accept the border in the mountainous region after learning more about the watershed 
of the Cenepa Valley. 
 This war began on January 09, 1995, after Peru learned that Ecuador had been secretly 
building military bases in the disputed area.  Peru captured two of the bases, but was unable to 
capture the third.  A cease-fire was announced in mid-February and fighting ended on February 
27, 1995.  The Declaration of Itamaraty, a peace treaty, was signed on March 17, 1995.  Minor 
border conflicts occurred through September, and all remaining issues were resolved with the 
signing of the Brasilia Presidential Act on October 26, 1998, granting Peru’s border claims, but 
also allowing Ecuador to build a war memorial at one of the previous bases, and granting 
Ecuador navigation rights along the Peruvian-controlled segment of the Amazon River.  Ecuador 
is named as the initiator, and the outcome is considered a compromise.  Ecuador suffered 550 
battle-related deaths; Peru, 950 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
Falkland Islands War 
 The Falkland Islands had switched between British and Spanish/Argentine control several 





1980s, the leader of Argentina, General Leopoldi Galtieri, declared that the islands were 
rightfully Argentina’s, as they were in Argentine waters.  He sent Argentine forces to the islands, 
and they quickly defeated the small British force there on March 25, 1982.  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, in return, launched a fleet of over one hundred ships which arrived 
at South Georgia Island on April 25.  Argentine forces on the island surrendered, and on May 02, 
the British sank an Argentine ship in a naval battle.  British troops began landing on the 
Falklands on May 21, and on June 15, Argentine forces surrendered the capital, Port Stanley.  
Argentina is coded as the initiator of this war, and the United Kingdom is considered the victor.  
Argentina suffered 746 battle-related deaths, compared to the United Kingdom’s 255 (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010). 
First Russo-Turkish War 
 After fighting alongside France and the United Kingdom to help Greece in its war for 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, Russia, itself, went to war against the Turks on April 
26, 1828.  Though the Russian military did not have much success around the Danube, they were 
able to make gains in the Caucasus, and reached the outskirts of Constantinople by the end of the 
summer.  The major European powers, however, were suspicious of a Russian occupation of 
Constantinople, and pushed the Ottoman Empire to concede defeat before the Russians reached 
the city.  The Treaty of Adrianople was signed on September 14, 1829, granting Russia 
additional territory along the Black Sea.  Russia is considered both the initiator and the victor of 
this war, and suffered 50,000 battle-related deaths, compared to the Ottoman Empire’s 80,000 






 Though Honduras and El Salvador had been allied in two Central American wars in the 
early twentieth century, tensions began increasing in the middle part of the century as each 
accused the other of border violations.  Many Hondurans also began blaming economic troubles 
on resident Salvadorans.  The national football teams of the two states met in June, 1969 for 
qualifying matches for the 1970 World Cup.  Honduras won the first game, and El Salvador won 
the second.  After the third resulted in a Salvadoran victory, Hondurans began assaulting resident 
Salvadorans. 
 El Salvador launched a preemptive attack on July 14, 1969, hoping the surprise would 
give them an advantage over the superior Honduran air force.  The states quickly agreed to a 
cease-fire which went into effect on July 18, 1969, though small skirmishes occasionally broke 
out through the end of the month.  Though Honduras is considered to have won the air battle, El 
Salvador is seen as the overall victor due to its occupation of Honduran territory.  El Salvador, 
also seen as the initiator, ceded the occupied territory back to Honduras in return for the latter’s 
agreement to protect resident Salvadorans.  Honduras suffered 1,200 battle-related deaths; El 
Salvador, 700 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
Mexican-American War 
 Texas gained independence from Mexico in the mid-1830s, but the border was still 
disputed upon the United States’ annexation of the former Mexican territory.  After Mexico 
rejected the US’s offer to negotiate the border and to purchase California and New Mexico, the 
United States moved troops into the disputed area.  Mexican forces entered the region and 





the battle plan of the United States originally did not involve pushing too deeply into Mexico, 
US troops eventually made their way to Mexico City after a series of military victories.  Fighting 
ended with the American capture of Mexico’s capital on September 14, 1847.  The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 02, 1848, in which Mexico agreed to US border 
claims for Texas and also sold New Mexico and Alta California to the United States for 
$15,000,000.  The United States is considered both the initiator and the victor, and suffered 
13,283 battle-related deaths, compared to Mexico’s 6,000 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
Second Ogaden War, Phase 2 
 After gaining independence, Somalia hoped to annex outside territories occupied by 
ethnic Somalis, and so offered support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which 
was then fighting against Ethiopia in the Ogaden region.  Haile Selassie was overthrown in a 
military coup in Ethiopia in 1974 and replaced by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, though he was 
soon opposed by the socialist-leaning Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party.  In order to 
provide greater support for the WSLF, Somalia invaded Ethiopia on July 23, 1977, and the 
Somali military was able to capture more than half of the Ogaden. 
 Somalia began suffering military defeats, however, after the Soviet Union shifted its 
support from Somalia to Ethiopia.  The Soviet Union airlifted Cuban troops into Ethiopia in 
November of that year, and the Somali military was forced back across the border.  Somalia 
declared an end to its involvement on March 09, 1978, and the war continued within Ethiopia as 
an intra-state civil war.  Somalia is considered the initiator of the interstate phase of this war; 
there is no clear victor, though Somali troops did withdraw from Ethiopia.  Somalia suffered 





Second Russo-Turkish War 
 What began as an intra-state civil war, with Bosnia and Bulgaria rising up against the 
Ottoman Empire, soon evolved into an extra-state war when Serbia, and later Montenegro, 
joined.  Before declaring war, Serbia unsuccessfully sought aid from both Russia and Austria.  
The two powers eventually signed a secret agreement in which Austria promised neutrality in the 
event of Russia’s involvement in the war, and would be permitted to occupy Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, while Russia would be allowed to occupy Bulgaria.  In April, 1877, Romania 
granted Russian troops permission to cross into their territory, and on April 24, Russia declared 
war on the Ottoman Empire.  Serbia had been defeated by this point, so Russia picked up much 
of the fighting itself and had several successes in the Caucasus, but ran into more difficulty in the 
Balkans.  Both Romania and Bulgaria declared their independence in May, and Russian forces 
launched their first major assault in the Balkans on July 20, but were stopped at Plevna.  The 
Russian military attempted for several months to capture the city, only succeeding with military 
assistance from Romania in November. 
 By the beginning of 1878, Russian troops occupied almost all of the European portion of 
the Ottoman Empire—all but the peninsula of Gallipoli and the areas around Constantinople—
and an armistice ended hostilities on January 31, 1878.  The Treaty of San Stefano was signed on 
February 19, 1878.  The subsequent Treaty of Berlin of 1878 forced the Ottoman Empire to give 
up much of its European territory, including land on the eastern coast of the Black Sea that was 
granted to Russia.  The Ottoman Empire was also forced to grant independence to Serbia and 
Romania, and autonomy to Bulgaria.  In all, Russia—considered the both initiator and the 
victor—suffered 120,000 battle-related deaths, compared to the Ottoman Empire’s 165,000 






 After withdrawing troops from Egypt, Britain viewed Cyprus, which it had gained from 
the Ottoman Empire in 1878, as an important colony in the region.  Frequent conflicts between 
Greek residents and Turkish residents, however, plagued the island.  Cyprus gained its 
independence with the signing of the London-Zurich agreements between the United Kingdom, 
Greece, and Turkey in 1959.  The signatories agreed that Cyprus would not be partitioned, but 
that their respective countries would be allowed to maintain military bases on the island.  The 
united government, however, devolved into two separate governments—one representing 
Cypriot Turks and one representing Cypriot Greeks—by 1964, and in 1974, Greek Cypriot 
president Archbishop Makarios requested that Greece and Turkey each remove their troops from 
the island.  Greek forces subsequently overthrew him in a coup on July 15, 1974 and Turkey, 
fearing that the island would be handed over to Greece, sent 8,000 troops to aid the 750 Turkish 
units already there.  Turkey soon sent more, bringing their troop total on the island to 40,000, 
compared to the 13,000 Greek troops. 
 Turkey was able to turn back Greek reinforcements, and on July 18 demanded the 
withdrawal of all Greek forces on the island.  After Greece refused, Turkey began a ground 
invasion and air attacks on July 20, 1974.  Fighting stopped temporarily after the two sides 
agreed to a United Nations-backed ceasefire on July 30, but hostilities resumed after the failure 
of a second round of negotiations that had lasted from August 8-14.  A second cease-fire was 
agreed to on August 16, 1974, at which point there existed a de facto partitioning of the island, 
with the Turks controlling roughly 40% of the island for the roughly 20% of the island’s 
population comprised of Turkic Cypriots.  UN troops were stationed along the dividing “Attila 





battle-related deaths, is considered both the initiator and the victor; Cyprus suffered 500 battle-
related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
Ugandan-Tanzanian War 
 Relations became strained between Uganda and Tanzania after Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere publicly denounced Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, and after members of the army of 
former Ugandan president Milton Obote unsuccessfully invaded from Tanzania in an attempt to 
restore Obote in 1972.  Ugandan troops invaded Tanzania on October 28, 1978 and pushed 
inwards twenty miles, at which point Amin announced his intention of annexing the newly 
occupied territory.  Tanzania counterattacked on November 11, reaching the Ugandan border by 
November 14 and pushing into Uganda in January 1979 with the encouragement of other states 
in the region.  The Ugandan army all but disappeared, leaving 2,700 Libyan troops to defend 
Amin.  Most of the Libyan units were removed from Uganda after an unsuccessful battle in 
April, and the combined Tanzanian forces and Uganda National Liberation Army were able to 
capture Kampala on April 11, 1979.  Amin fled the country, and Obote returned to power after 
elections at the end of 1980.  The results of these elections were contested, however, leading to 
two intra-state wars in the 1980s.  Uganda is considered the initiator of the Ugandan-Tanzanian 
War and suffered 1,500 battle-related deaths.  Tanzania, considered the victor, suffered 1,000 
battle-related deaths.  Libya suffered 500 battle-related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
War over Angola 
 This war is rooted in Angola’s independence movement, and stemmed from its thirteen-





form a coalition government until independence was officially granted on November 11, 1975, at 
which point elections were to be held to establish an independent government.  Fighting broke 
out between the rebel groups, however, before Angola was officially granted its independence, 
and the various rebel groups soon gained support from outside actors, transforming the conflict 
into an inter-state war on October 23, 1975.  South Africa, supporting both the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola (FNLA), invaded Angola and occupied territory in the south.  Several thousand Cuban 
troops, along with Soviet advisers, assisted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) in fighting the South African military.  As South Africa and UNITA advanced through 
the south, the FNLA, aided by Zairian troops, advanced from the north. 
 Angola officially entered the war as a member of the interstate system upon 
independence in November.  The MPLA, based in Luanda, and the alliance of the FNLA and 
UNITA, based in Huambo, each declared their own governments—the former declaring the 
People’s Republic of Angola and the latter declaring the Social Democratic Republic of Angola, 
though only the former was recognized as the state’s government.  MPLA forces soon received 
additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms, giving them a greater advantage over the other groups.  
The MPLA was able to make further gains in both the north and the south, and was able to beat 
back a UNITA-led offensive through that summer.  Most of the South African troops were 
forced back across the Angolan border by February 12, 1976, marking what is considered the 
end of the inter-state war and the transition to the intra-state Angolan Control War.  South Africa 





100 battle-related deaths.  Cuba suffered 1,500, and Angola suffered 1,000 battle-related deaths 
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
War over the Aouzou Strip 
 This war developed from some of the political and regional developments of a civil war 
fought in Chad in 1980.  The civil war was a conflict between the Popular Armed Forces (FAP), 
loyal to Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei, and the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), loyal 
to the state’s minister of defense, Hissene Habre.  Libya supported the FAP troops, and, after 
military success, declared Chad and Libya to be united.  After Libyan forces left Chad, FAN 
troops returned to the country with the support of France.  Habre was able to remain in office and 
France and Libya agreed to remove their armies, though Libya then continued to occupy the 
Aouzou Strip.  This inter-state war officially began on November 15, 1986, after Habre’s forces 
shot down a Libyan plane.  Over the next several months, Habre’s forces, with the help of 
France, were able to push Libya out of the Aouzou Strip.  The war ended on September 11, 1987, 
with agreement to a cease-fire sponsored by the Organization of African Unity.  The status of the 
Aouzou Strip, however, was not resolved until the International Court of Justice ruled in Chad’s 







 The idea in this thesis is to test whether war has an overall negative effect on a state’s 
economy.  As Level and Shock each only provide a partial picture of the effects of war on a 
state’s economy, it is necessary to combine the two variables—that is, to add them together—to 
gain a better understanding of the full effects of war on a state’s economy.  For those cases that 
have a negative overall coefficient after Level and Shock are combined, it can be inferred that 
the war came with costs, having had a negative effect on the state’s economy.  For those cases 
with a positive overall coefficient, the war would appear to have paid, in that it had a positive 
effect on the state’s economy. 
 When controlling for time and the various changes in the measurement of the energy 
consumption variable, and when including a lag variable, five of the eleven cases tested had a 
negative overall coefficient, while seven had a positive overall coefficient.  This early look 
would appear to give a mixed result as to whether war comes with costs, as held by the Liberal 
Theory. 
 Level and Shock, however, only reach significance in three of the eleven cases: the 
Football War, the Second Ogaden War, Phase 2, and the War Over Angola.  Interestingly, in 
each of these three cases, Shock has a negative effect, indicating an immediate negative effect of 
war, and Level has a positive effect, indicating a positive growth over time.  When adding Shock 
and Level together, though, only the Football War has a negative overall effect on the initiator’s 
energy consumption, as was hypothesized.  The other two cases—the Second Ogaden War, 
Phase 2, and the War Over Angola—each had positive overall effects on the economies of the 





order serial correlation: when determining the Durbin-Watson statistic, the result fell within the 






Table 1:  Effects of War on a State’s Economy 
War Initiator D. Freedom Time Lag Level Shock Level + Shock
Turco-Cypriot War 1974 Turkey 33 638.84 0.67 *** -4493.23 3128.08 -1365.15
Falkland Islands War 1982 Argentina 33 792.30 ** 0.60 *** -1377.90 500.54 -877.36
Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-1979 Uganda 30 73.35 *** 0.10 *** -200.91 54.23 -146.68
War Over the Aouzou Strip 1986-1987 Chad 33 12.09 *** 0.18 *** -77.39 11.06 -66.33
Football War 1969 El Salvador 35 15.24 ** 0.51 *** 1127.48 *** -1168.39 *** -40.91
First Russo-Turkish War 1828-1829 Russia 28 1.32 * 0.75 *** -11.35 3.83 -7.52
Second Ogaden War, Phase 2 1977-1978 Somalia 31 53.21 *** 0.05 298.17 ** -290.14 ** 8.03
Mexican-American War 1846-1847 United States of America 36 36.30 0.99 *** 203.98 -28.87 175.11
Second Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 Russia 34 154.45 *** 0.36 *** 489.21 -183.70 305.51
Cenepa Valley War 1995 Ecuador 27 237.82 * 0.34 329.26 1441.34 1770.60
War Over Angola 1975-1976 South Africa 34 877.84 * 0.45 *** 17450.93 ** -12153.13 * 5297.80
* indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level








 Based on these results, it does not appear that one can be certain that war is associated 
with costs.  In only one of the eleven cases tested did war have the expected negative and 
significant overall effect on a state’s economy.  And though two of the cases are positive and 
significant, they may—or may not—suffer from autocorrelation.  But with only one case 
showing the expected result of a negative effect, these results appear to weaken the Liberal 
Theory, which maintains that war interrupts trade, which in turn negatively affects a state’s 
economy. 
 Perhaps substitution and elasticity, then, are enough to keep a state’s economy from 
going into decline during wartime.  That is, perhaps the states analyzed in this study were able to 
compensate for potential lost trade with the wartime enemy by trading with other states or for 
other products.  It should be noted, though, that none of the wars analyzed lasted a particularly 
long time.  The longest period of conflict in this study is that of the Mexican-American War, 
which lasted just under seventeen months.  This is closely followed by the First Russo-Turkish 
War, which lasted one day less.  Of the other wars, none lasted more than ten months.  The 
shortest was the Football War, which lasted only four days. 
 The implication here is that the results may vary for prolonged wars—wars lasting more 
than a year.  The two used in this analysis that last over a year are from the early- to mid-
nineteenth century; perhaps results would be different in later decades, especially with the great 
increases in interdependence in the late-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century.  
If the time period of the war does play a factor, however, it can certainly not be acting alone.  





1969-1978, there were other cases tested that occurred within or very close to this same time 
period but did not achieve significance. 
 Interdependence should also play a greater role in future studies.  As the goal of this 
analysis was to determine whether war has costs for the initiator, a variable measuring trade may 
be helpful for further testing (and a better understanding) of the relation between war and trade, 
and whether, as the Liberal Peace Theory maintains, trade reduces the likelihood of conflict.  Of 
course, with substitution and elasticity in mind, trade may not be as important a factor as 
previously believed when attempting to determine the effects of war on a state’s economy; 
however, trade was not accounted for in this analysis, and it is not known whether the states 







 Though there has been a divide in the literature between Realist Theory and Liberal 
Theory, much of the empirical work tends to support the latter.  This body of work generally 
finds support for the claim that interdependence decreases the likelihood of conflict.  Part of this 
theory, though, is the simple acceptance of the idea that war comes with costs.  The idea behind 
this is that two trading states lose out on their trade when they go to war with each other, and that 
this loss of trade, in turn, negatively affects the economy, as each state is no longer obtaining 
necessary or desired resources.  When assuming national decision makers are rational actors, 
pursuing the economic prosperity of their respective states, it follows that these decision makers 
would want to avoid war; that is, unless there is a compelling reason, they would not want to 
pursue anything that might harm the economy. 
 Due to the principles of substitution and elasticity, however, there may not necessarily be 
a decline in overall trade for a state when a war starts.  If State i is receiving bananas from State 
j, but then the two states declare war on one another, State i can obtain bananas from another 
state, at least until the war ends.  Or, in terms of elasticity, State i can forgo bananas entirely, 
since bananas are not a necessity of life. 
 Looking only at trade during conflict, then, may not provide a full picture of what is 
happening to a state’s economy.  That is why this thesis analyzed energy consumption as a proxy 
for GDP.  Looking more directly at a state’s economy ought to provide a fuller picture and better 
understanding of whether, as the Liberal Theory maintains, war has a negative effect on a state’s 
economy.  Because much of the literature on the topic of trade and war tends to support the 





state’s economy.  That is, the expected finding would be a decline in energy consumption within 
a state as a result of a war. 
 The Inter-State War Dataset from the Correlates of War was used to obtain a list of wars 
and their initiators.  The idea behind analyzing only initiators is that, regardless of any other 
facts, these states were not deterred by any potential costs of war—the leaders of these states felt 
that war was a necessity, or at least that there were no better alternatives, in order to obtain a 
desired goal.  A time series analysis model was used, with up to twenty years before and up to 
twenty years after each war event analyzed in the study.  Wars were eliminated if any other wars 
occurred in this pre- or post-war period.  Due to missing data and other factors, the sample size 
was eventually reduced to eleven. 
 Variables used in the analysis include Level and Shock, Time, Lag, and dummy variables 
to control for changes in the measurement of energy consumption within the National Material 
Capabilities dataset obtained from the Correlates of War.  Of the eleven cases analyzed, three 
reached significance, and of these, one was in the expected negative direction.  Of the eleven 
wars studied, then, there only appeared to be a statistically significant negative effect in one 
case—the Football War, initiated by El Salvador against Honduras in 1969.  The other two wars 
that reached significance—the Second Ogaden War, Phase 2, and the War Over Angola—appear 
to have had positive effects on the respective initiators’ economies.  Each of these cases, 
however, contained evidence of autocorrelation. 
 It does not seem as though it can be concluded, then, that war necessarily comes with 
costs.  Only one war analyzed in this study had a statistically significant negative effect on the 





effect on a state’s economy.  This result weakens the Liberal Theory, which maintains that war 
necessarily has a negative effect on a state’s economy.  Due to substitution and elasticity, it 
seems that a state is able to maintain a relatively stable economy in spite of war, as there is a 
statistically significant negative result in only one of the eleven cases in this study. 
 Future researchers should almost certainly delve deeper into this topic, as the belief that 
war necessarily comes with costs is an important component of a major theory of international 
relations.  This belief, though, based on the results of this study, may not be entirely accurate.  
Though many scholars have found that interdependence lessens the likelihood of conflict, it may 
not be correct to assume that this is due solely to leaders not wanting to disturb their respective 
states’ economies.  There may very well be any number of other factors that lower the likelihood 
of conflict among interdependent states.  If a leader’s economic worries are in fact what keeps 
these states from going to war with each other, this worry is not supported by the findings of this 
analysis. 
 It may also be helpful for future researchers to analyze the effects of war on non-
initiators.  Though the idea of this analysis was to study “wars of choice,” it would be interesting 
and beneficial to the field to determine whether states that do not initiate a war tend to 
experience different consequences than those that do initiate.  Similarly, initiators may have 
information leading up to war that leads them to believe that they will be victorious, while non-
initiators might have avoided initiating a war out of a fear of defeat.  This then, leads to a 
potential selection bias in this paper, but one that could easily be addressed in future works. 
 Resources may be an important factor to evaluate in future research, as well.  The 





state in its fight against its opponent.  This project did not consider resources, based on the idea 
that they contribute to the overall economy.  A new discover though, may lead to a change that 







LIST OF CASES ANALYZED 
INCLUDING INITIATOR 
DATE AND LENGTH OF WAR 








Cenepa Valley War 
Dates of War:  January 09, 1995-February 27, 1995 
Length of War:  Seven weeks 
Initiator:  Ecuador 
Data span:  1975-2007 
 
Falkland Islands War 
Dates of War:  March 25, 1982-June 15, 1982 
Length of War:  Two months, three weeks 
Initiator:  Argentina 
Data span:  1962-2002 
 
First Russo-Turkish War 
Dates of War:  April 26, 1828-September 14, 1829 
Length of War:  One year, two months, four weeks, five days 
Initiator:  Russia 
Data span:  1816-1849 
 
Football War 
Dates of War:  July 14, 1969-July 18, 1969 
Length of War:  Four days 
Initiator:  El Salvador 
Data span:  1950-1989 
 
Mexican-American War 
Dates of War:  April 25, 1846-September 14, 1847 
Length of War:  One year, four month, two weeks, six days 
Initiator:  United States of America 
Data span:  1826-1867 
 
Second Ogaden War, Phase 2 
Dates of War:  July 23, 1977-March 09, 1978 
Length of War:  Seven months, two weeks 
Initiator:  Somalia 
Data span:  1960-1998 
 
Second Russo-Turkish War 
Dates of War:  April 24, 1877-January 31, 1878 
Length of War:  Nine months, one week 
Initiator:  Russia 










Dates of War:  July 20, 1974-July 29, 1974 
Length of War:  Nine days 
Initiator:  Turkey 
Data span:  1954-1994 
 
Ugandan-Tanzanian War 
Dates of War:  October 28, 1978-April 11, 1979 
Length of War:  Five months, two weeks 
Initiator:  Uganda 
Data span:  1962-1999 
 
War Over Angola 
Dates of War:  October 23, 1975-February 12, 1976 
Length of War:  Three months, two weeks, six days 
Initiator:  South Africa 
Data span:  1955-1996 
 
War Over the Aouzou Strip 
Dates of War:  November 15, 1986-September 11, 1987 
Length of War:  Nine months, three weeks, six days 
Initiator:  Chad 















Table 2:  Cenepa Valley War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time pec_L1
ECU 130 1975 5364.084 0 0 1 .
ECU 130 1976 5492.045 0 0 2 5364.084
ECU 130 1977 5384.253 0 0 3 5492.045
ECU 130 1978 8640.312 0 0 4 5384.253
ECU 130 1979 9607.498 0 0 5 8640.312
ECU 130 1980 9962.08 0 0 6 9607.498
ECU 130 1981 10842.24 0 0 7 9962.08
ECU 130 1982 11952.74 0 0 8 10842.24
ECU 130 1983 11641.91 0 0 9 11952.74
ECU 130 1984 13155.39 0 0 10 11641.91
ECU 130 1985 12079.69 0 0 11 13155.39
ECU 130 1986 10904.61 0 0 12 12079.69
ECU 130 1987 9833.174 0 0 13 10904.61
ECU 130 1988 12674.64 0 0 14 9833.174
ECU 130 1989 13825.55 0 0 15 12674.64
ECU 130 1990 12450.75 0 0 16 13825.55
ECU 130 1991 12428.07 0 0 17 12450.75
ECU 130 1992 14754.06 0 0 18 12428.07
ECU 130 1993 16884.55 0 0 19 14754.06
ECU 130 1994 12141.96 0 0 20 16884.55
ECU 130 1995 15848.81 1 1 21 12141.96
ECU 130 1996 17136.3 1 0 22 15848.81
ECU 130 1997 15211.53 1 0 23 17136.3
ECU 130 1998 16225.27 1 0 24 15211.53
ECU 130 1999 16832.59 1 0 25 16225.27
ECU 130 2000 17920.41 1 0 26 16832.59
ECU 130 2001 17619.99 1 0 27 17920.41
ECU 130 2002 17730.37 1 0 28 17619.99
ECU 130 2003 17776.76 1 0 29 17730.37
ECU 130 2004 19016.46 1 0 30 17776.76
ECU 130 2005 18296.07 1 0 31 19016.46
ECU 130 2006 19067.9 1 0 32 18296.07
ECU 130 2007 19705.87 1 0 33 19067.9  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  






Table 3:  Falkland Islands War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
ARG 160 1962 25766 0 0 1 0 0 .
ARG 160 1963 25926 0 0 2 0 0 25766
ARG 160 1964 27539 0 0 3 0 0 25926
ARG 160 1965 30656 0 0 4 0 0 27539
ARG 160 1966 34349 0 0 5 0 0 30656
ARG 160 1967 34837 0 0 6 0 0 34349
ARG 160 1968 37762 0 0 7 0 0 34837
ARG 160 1969 39359 0 0 8 0 0 37762
ARG 160 1970 46367.18 0 0 9 1 0 39359
ARG 160 1971 49895.31 0 0 10 1 0 46367.18
ARG 160 1972 52019.18 0 0 11 1 0 49895.31
ARG 160 1973 53948.95 0 0 12 1 0 52019.18
ARG 160 1974 55302.43 0 0 13 1 0 53948.95
ARG 160 1975 55183.5 0 0 14 1 0 55302.43
ARG 160 1976 58684.85 0 0 15 1 0 55183.5
ARG 160 1977 61449.12 0 0 16 1 0 58684.85
ARG 160 1978 61972.02 0 0 17 1 0 61449.12
ARG 160 1979 65424.25 0 0 18 1 0 61972.02
ARG 160 1980 69521.81 0 0 19 1 0 65424.25
ARG 160 1981 68877.6 0 0 20 1 0 69521.81
ARG 160 1982 70309.05 1 1 21 1 0 68877.6
ARG 160 1983 71453.76 1 0 22 1 0 70309.05
ARG 160 1984 78634.93 1 0 23 1 1 71453.76
ARG 160 1985 78635.73 1 0 24 1 1 78634.93
ARG 160 1986 77236.48 1 0 25 1 1 78635.73
ARG 160 1987 82843.07 1 0 26 1 1 77236.48
ARG 160 1988 87315.22 1 0 27 1 1 82843.07
ARG 160 1989 89974.13 1 0 28 1 1 87315.22
ARG 160 1990 90541.58 1 0 29 1 1 89974.13
ARG 160 1991 93022.66 1 0 30 1 1 90541.58
ARG 160 1992 90711.57 1 0 31 1 1 93022.66
ARG 160 1993 86533.07 1 0 32 1 1 90711.57
ARG 160 1994 89110.45 1 0 33 1 1 86533.07
ARG 160 1995 88240.67 1 0 34 1 1 89110.45
ARG 160 1996 93318.53 1 0 35 1 1 88240.67
ARG 160 1997 100024.3 1 0 36 1 1 93318.53
ARG 160 1998 100607.4 1 0 37 1 1 100024.3
ARG 160 1999 107651.4 1 0 38 1 1 100607.4
ARG 160 2000 107570.9 1 0 39 1 1 107651.4
ARG 160 2001 117034.3 1 0 40 1 1 107570.9
ARG 160 2002 115654.3 1 0 41 1 1 117034.3  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 





Table 4:  First Russo-Turkish War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time pec_L1
RUS 365 1816 15 0 0 1 .
RUS 365 1817 15 0 0 2 15
RUS 365 1818 14 0 0 3 15
RUS 365 1819 14 0 0 4 14
RUS 365 1820 14 0 0 5 14
RUS 365 1821 14 0 0 6 14
RUS 365 1822 14 0 0 7 14
RUS 365 1823 14 0 0 8 14
RUS 365 1824 27 0 0 9 14
RUS 365 1825 27 0 0 10 27
RUS 365 1826 27 0 0 11 27
RUS 365 1827 26 0 0 12 27
RUS 365 1828 26 1 1 13 26
RUS 365 1829 26 1 1 14 26
RUS 365 1830 26 1 0 15 26
RUS 365 1831 25 1 0 16 26
RUS 365 1832 25 1 0 17 25
RUS 365 1833 25 1 0 18 25
RUS 365 1834 25 1 0 19 25
RUS 365 1835 37 1 0 20 25
RUS 365 1836 37 1 0 21 37
RUS 365 1837 37 1 0 22 37
RUS 365 1838 37 1 0 23 37
RUS 365 1839 49 1 0 24 37
RUS 365 1840 61 1 0 25 49
RUS 365 1841 61 1 0 26 61
RUS 365 1842 67 1 0 27 61
RUS 365 1843 59 1 0 28 67
RUS 365 1844 71 1 0 29 59
RUS 365 1845 83 1 0 30 71
RUS 365 1846 99 1 0 31 83
RUS 365 1847 94 1 0 32 99
RUS 365 1848 107 1 0 33 94
RUS 365 1849 107 1 0 34 107  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  






Table 5:  Football War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum pec_L1
SAL 92 1949 . 0 0 1 0 .
SAL 92 1950 8 0 0 2 0 0
SAL 92 1951 9 0 0 3 0 8
SAL 92 1952 11 0 0 4 0 9
SAL 92 1953 15 0 0 5 0 11
SAL 92 1954 16 0 0 6 0 15
SAL 92 1955 18 0 0 7 0 16
SAL 92 1956 20 0 0 8 0 18
SAL 92 1957 23 0 0 9 0 20
SAL 92 1958 26 0 0 10 0 23
SAL 92 1959 29 0 0 11 0 26
SAL 92 1960 31 0 0 12 0 29
SAL 92 1961 34 0 0 13 0 31
SAL 92 1962 37 0 0 14 0 34
SAL 92 1963 42 0 0 15 0 37
SAL 92 1964 47 0 0 16 0 42
SAL 92 1965 51 0 0 17 0 47
SAL 92 1966 59 0 0 18 0 51
SAL 92 1967 64 0 0 19 0 59
SAL 92 1968 827 0 0 20 0 64
SAL 92 1969 592 1 1 21 0 827
SAL 92 1970 1750.667 1 0 22 1 592
SAL 92 1971 2234.43 1 0 23 1 1750.667
SAL 92 1972 2321.98 1 0 24 1 2234.43
SAL 92 1973 2592.564 1 0 25 1 2321.98
SAL 92 1974 2680.553 1 0 26 1 2592.564
SAL 92 1975 2738.983 1 0 27 1 2680.553
SAL 92 1976 2913.032 1 0 28 1 2738.983
SAL 92 1977 3077.729 1 0 29 1 2913.032
SAL 92 1978 3179.056 1 0 30 1 3077.729
SAL 92 1979 3214.716 1 0 31 1 3179.056
SAL 92 1980 3116.215 1 0 32 1 3214.716
SAL 92 1981 2941.071 1 0 33 1 3116.215
SAL 92 1982 2936.23 1 0 34 1 2941.071
SAL 92 1983 3080.931 1 0 35 1 2936.23
SAL 92 1984 3103.419 1 0 36 1 3080.931
SAL 92 1985 3255.685 1 0 37 1 3103.419
SAL 92 1986 3290.122 1 0 38 1 3255.685
SAL 92 1987 3361.299 1 0 39 1 3290.122
SAL 92 1988 3292.533 1 0 40 1 3361.299
SAL 92 1989 3347.112 1 0 41 1 3292.533  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” controls for changes in the source material in 





Table 6:  Mexican-American War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time pec_L1
USA 2 1826 502 0 0 1 .
USA 2 1827 556 0 0 2 502
USA 2 1828 609 0 0 3 556
USA 2 1829 686 0 0 4 609
USA 2 1830 799 0 0 5 686
USA 2 1831 864 0 0 6 799
USA 2 1832 1154 0 0 7 864
USA 2 1833 1348 0 0 8 1154
USA 2 1834 1291 0 0 9 1348
USA 2 1835 1650 0 0 10 1291
USA 2 1836 1807 0 0 11 1650
USA 2 1837 2027 0 0 12 1807
USA 2 1838 1922 0 0 13 2027
USA 2 1839 2159 0 0 14 1922
USA 2 1840 2244 0 0 15 2159
USA 2 1841 2374 0 0 16 2244
USA 2 1842 2643 0 0 17 2374
USA 2 1843 2967 0 0 18 2643
USA 2 1844 3557 0 0 19 2967
USA 2 1845 4284 0 0 20 3557
USA 2 1846 4863 1 1 21 4284
USA 2 1847 5767 1 1 22 4863
USA 2 1848 6424 1 0 23 5767
USA 2 1849 6976 1 0 24 6424
USA 2 1850 7607 1 0 25 6976
USA 2 1851 9438 1 0 26 7607
USA 2 1852 10270 1 0 27 9438
USA 2 1853 11570 1 0 28 10270
USA 2 1854 13632 1 0 29 11570
USA 2 1855 14651 1 0 30 13632
USA 2 1856 15378 1 0 31 14651
USA 2 1857 15779 1 0 32 15378
USA 2 1858 16015 1 0 33 15779
USA 2 1859 17435 1 0 34 16015
USA 2 1860 18282 1 0 35 17435
USA 2 1861 17660 1 0 36 18282
USA 2 1862 18366 1 0 37 17660
USA 2 1863 21157 1 0 38 18366
USA 2 1864 22597 1 0 39 21157
USA 2 1865 22658 1 0 40 22597
USA 2 1866 26846 1 0 41 22658
USA 2 1867 28027 1 0 42 26846  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  





Table 7:  Second Ogaden War, Phase 2 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
SOM 520 1960 1 0 0 1 0 0 .
SOM 520 1961 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
SOM 520 1962 1 0 0 3 0 0 1
SOM 520 1963 1 0 0 4 0 0 1
SOM 520 1964 1 0 0 5 0 0 1
SOM 520 1965 2 0 0 6 0 0 1
SOM 520 1966 2 0 0 7 0 0 2
SOM 520 1967 2 0 0 8 0 0 2
SOM 520 1968 31 0 0 9 0 0 2
SOM 520 1969 44 0 0 10 0 0 31
SOM 520 1970 1315.293 0 0 11 1 0 44
SOM 520 1971 1345.654 0 0 12 1 0 1315.293
SOM 520 1972 1369.595 0 0 13 1 0 1345.654
SOM 520 1973 1411.201 0 0 14 1 0 1369.595
SOM 520 1974 1436.163 0 0 15 1 0 1411.201
SOM 520 1975 1493.515 0 0 16 1 0 1436.163
SOM 520 1976 1546.424 0 0 17 1 0 1493.515
SOM 520 1977 1593.809 1 1 18 1 0 1546.424
SOM 520 1978 1772.019 1 1 19 1 0 1593.809
SOM 520 1979 1883.248 1 0 20 1 0 1772.019
SOM 520 1980 2199.945 1 0 21 1 0 1883.248
SOM 520 1981 1960.557 1 0 22 1 0 2199.945
SOM 520 1982 2246.566 1 0 23 1 0 1960.557
SOM 520 1983 2394.667 1 0 24 1 0 2246.566
SOM 520 1984 2343.394 1 0 25 1 0 2394.667
SOM 520 1985 2476.518 1 0 26 1 0 2343.394
SOM 520 1986 2532.677 1 0 27 1 0 2476.518
SOM 520 1987 2590.334 1 0 28 1 0 2532.677
SOM 520 1988 2624.251 1 0 29 1 0 2590.334
SOM 520 1989 2647.707 1 0 30 1 0 2624.251
SOM 520 1990 2014.773 1 0 31 1 1 2647.707
SOM 520 1991 2079.592 1 0 32 1 1 2014.773
SOM 520 1992 2220.972 1 0 33 1 1 2079.592
SOM 520 1993 2264.974 1 0 34 1 1 2220.972
SOM 520 1994 2321.597 1 0 35 1 1 2264.974
SOM 520 1995 2400.495 1 0 36 1 1 2321.597
SOM 520 1996 2500.24 1 0 37 1 1 2400.495
SOM 520 1997 2619.932 1 0 38 1 1 2500.24
SOM 520 1998 2710.183 1 0 39 1 1 2619.932  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 






Table 8:  Second Russo-Turkish War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
RUS 365 1857 213 0 0 1 0 0 .
RUS 365 1858 229 0 0 2 0 0 213
RUS 365 1859 250 0 0 3 0 0 229
RUS 365 1860 300 0 0 4 0 0 250
RUS 365 1861 400 0 0 5 0 0 300
RUS 365 1862 300 0 0 6 0 0 400
RUS 365 1863 400 0 0 7 0 0 300
RUS 365 1864 400 0 0 8 0 0 400
RUS 365 1865 400 0 0 9 0 0 400
RUS 365 1866 1050 0 0 10 1 0 400
RUS 365 1867 1203 0 0 11 1 0 1050
RUS 365 1868 977 0 0 12 1 0 1203
RUS 365 1869 1403 0 0 13 1 0 977
RUS 365 1870 1545 0 0 14 1 0 1403
RUS 365 1871 2038 0 0 15 1 0 1545
RUS 365 1872 2162 0 0 16 1 0 2038
RUS 365 1873 2033 0 0 17 1 0 2162
RUS 365 1874 2337 0 0 18 1 0 2033
RUS 365 1875 2741 0 0 19 1 0 2337
RUS 365 1876 3298 0 0 20 1 0 2741
RUS 365 1877 3281 1 1 21 1 0 3298
RUS 365 1878 4321 1 1 22 1 0 3281
RUS 365 1879 4386 1 0 23 1 0 4321
RUS 365 1880 5222 1 0 24 1 0 4386
RUS 365 1881 5291 1 0 25 1 0 5222
RUS 365 1882 5530 1 0 26 1 0 5291
RUS 365 1883 6183 1 0 27 1 0 5530
RUS 365 1884 5691 1 0 28 1 0 6183
RUS 365 1885 5870 1 0 29 1 0 5691
RUS 365 1886 6115 1 0 30 1 0 5870
RUS 365 1887 5631 1 0 31 1 0 6115
RUS 365 1888 6123 1 0 32 1 0 5631
RUS 365 1889 7232 1 0 33 1 0 6123
RUS 365 1890 6622 1 0 34 1 0 7232
RUS 365 1891 6678 1 0 35 1 0 6622
RUS 365 1892 7227 1 0 36 1 0 6678
RUS 365 1893 8196 1 0 37 1 0 7227
RUS 365 1894 9807 1 0 38 1 0 8196
RUS 365 1895 19693 1 0 39 1 1 9807
RUS 365 1896 20385 1 0 40 1 1 19693
RUS 365 1897 23095 1 0 41 1 1 20385
RUS 365 1898 25991 1 0 42 1 1 23095  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 





Table 9:  Turco-Cypriot War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
TUR 640 1954 3867 0 0 1 0 0 .
TUR 640 1955 3896 0 0 2 0 0 3867
TUR 640 1956 4325 0 0 3 0 0 3896
TUR 640 1957 4681 0 0 4 0 0 4325
TUR 640 1958 4842 0 0 5 0 0 4681
TUR 640 1959 4675 0 0 6 0 0 4842
TUR 640 1960 4708 0 0 7 0 0 4675
TUR 640 1961 5016 0 0 8 0 0 4708
TUR 640 1962 8442 0 0 9 0 0 5016
TUR 640 1963 9915 0 0 10 0 0 8442
TUR 640 1964 11571 0 0 11 0 0 9915
TUR 640 1965 11663 0 0 12 0 0 11571
TUR 640 1966 13070 0 0 13 0 0 11663
TUR 640 1967 13626 0 0 14 0 0 13070
TUR 640 1968 14787 0 0 15 0 0 13626
TUR 640 1969 15111 0 0 16 0 0 14787
TUR 640 1970 26727.19 0 0 17 1 0 15111
TUR 640 1971 28982.4 0 0 18 1 0 26727.19
TUR 640 1972 34205.38 0 0 19 1 0 28982.4
TUR 640 1973 35353.68 0 0 20 1 0 34205.38
TUR 640 1974 37624.51 1 1 21 1 0 35353.68
TUR 640 1975 39013.16 1 0 22 1 0 37624.51
TUR 640 1976 42515.45 1 0 23 1 0 39013.16
TUR 640 1977 36888.19 1 0 24 1 0 42515.45
TUR 640 1978 35517.45 1 0 25 1 0 36888.19
TUR 640 1979 35928.55 1 0 26 1 0 35517.45
TUR 640 1980 38387.97 1 0 27 1 0 35928.55
TUR 640 1981 40379 1 0 28 1 0 38387.97
TUR 640 1982 46511.8 1 0 29 1 0 40379
TUR 640 1983 47169.81 1 0 30 1 0 46511.8
TUR 640 1984 95689.73 1 0 31 1 1 47169.81
TUR 640 1985 99105 1 0 32 1 1 95689.73
TUR 640 1986 108925 1 0 33 1 1 99105
TUR 640 1987 123420.3 1 0 34 1 1 108925
TUR 640 1988 139162.2 1 0 35 1 1 123420.3
TUR 640 1989 138983.4 1 0 36 1 1 139162.2
TUR 640 1990 158075.2 1 0 37 1 1 138983.4
TUR 640 1991 153181 1 0 38 1 1 158075.2
TUR 640 1992 160563.8 1 0 39 1 1 153181
TUR 640 1993 176736.5 1 0 40 1 1 160563.8
TUR 640 1994 177623.7 1 0 41 1 1 176736.5  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 





Table 10:  Ugandan-Tanzanian War 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
UGA 500 1962 56 0 0 1 0 0 .
UGA 500 1963 61 0 0 2 0 0 56
UGA 500 1964 64 0 0 3 0 0 61
UGA 500 1965 73 0 0 4 0 0 64
UGA 500 1966 83 0 0 5 0 0 73
UGA 500 1967 92 0 0 6 0 0 83
UGA 500 1968 101 0 0 7 0 0 92
UGA 500 1969 103 0 0 8 0 0 101
UGA 500 1970 2289.856 0 0 9 1 0 103
UGA 500 1971 2361.802 0 0 10 1 0 2289.856
UGA 500 1972 2393.908 0 0 11 1 0 2361.802
UGA 500 1973 2391.841 0 0 12 1 0 2393.908
UGA 500 1974 2419.035 0 0 13 1 0 2391.841
UGA 500 1975 2456.753 0 0 14 1 0 2419.035
UGA 500 1976 2509.976 0 0 15 1 0 2456.753
UGA 500 1977 2581.87 0 0 16 1 0 2509.976
UGA 500 1978 2652.709 1 1 17 1 0 2581.87
UGA 500 1979 2736.964 1 1 18 1 0 2652.709
UGA 500 1980 2810.741 1 0 19 1 0 2736.964
UGA 500 1981 2862.124 1 0 20 1 0 2810.741
UGA 500 1982 2941.536 1 0 21 1 0 2862.124
UGA 500 1983 2993.962 1 0 22 1 0 2941.536
UGA 500 1984 3087.265 1 0 23 1 0 2993.962
UGA 500 1985 3155.858 1 0 24 1 0 3087.265
UGA 500 1986 3215.112 1 0 25 1 0 3155.858
UGA 500 1987 3294.743 1 0 26 1 0 3215.112
UGA 500 1988 3380.563 1 0 27 1 0 3294.743
UGA 500 1989 3486.992 1 0 28 1 0 3380.563
UGA 500 1990 9319.499 1 0 29 1 1 3486.992
UGA 500 1991 9527.957 1 0 30 1 1 9319.499
UGA 500 1992 9790.24 1 0 31 1 1 9527.957
UGA 500 1993 9996.09 1 0 32 1 1 9790.24
UGA 500 1994 10222.23 1 0 33 1 1 9996.09
UGA 500 1995 10341.02 1 0 34 1 1 10222.23
UGA 500 1996 10530 1 0 35 1 1 10341.02
UGA 500 1997 10712.12 1 0 36 1 1 10530
UGA 500 1998 10788.72 1 0 37 1 1 10712.12
UGA 500 1999 10949.24 1 0 38 1 1 10788.72  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 






Table 11:  War Over Angola 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 pec_L1
SAF 560 1955 28473 0 0 1 0 0 .
SAF 560 1956 29762 0 0 2 0 0 28473
SAF 560 1957 30795 0 0 3 0 0 29762
SAF 560 1958 32847 0 0 4 0 0 30795
SAF 560 1959 32287 0 0 5 0 0 32847
SAF 560 1960 33810 0 0 6 0 0 32287
SAF 560 1961 35043 0 0 7 0 0 33810
SAF 560 1962 36563 0 0 8 0 0 35043
SAF 560 1963 37656 0 0 9 0 0 36563
SAF 560 1964 40082 0 0 10 0 0 37656
SAF 560 1965 42622 0 0 11 0 0 40082
SAF 560 1966 41869 0 0 12 0 0 42622
SAF 560 1967 43728 0 0 13 0 0 41869
SAF 560 1968 46215 0 0 14 0 0 43728
SAF 560 1969 47438 0 0 15 0 0 46215
SAF 560 1970 74460.77 0 0 16 1 0 47438
SAF 560 1971 82575.63 0 0 17 1 0 74460.77
SAF 560 1972 84555.09 0 0 18 1 0 82575.63
SAF 560 1973 88699.52 0 0 19 1 0 84555.09
SAF 560 1974 92611.17 0 0 20 1 0 88699.52
SAF 560 1975 100335.7 1 1 21 1 0 92611.17
SAF 560 1976 104292.6 1 1 22 1 0 100335.7
SAF 560 1977 108868.1 1 0 23 1 0 104292.6
SAF 560 1978 110735.5 1 0 24 1 0 108868.1
SAF 560 1979 117340.1 1 0 25 1 0 110735.5
SAF 560 1980 126267 1 0 26 1 0 117340.1
SAF 560 1981 141718.3 1 0 27 1 0 126267
SAF 560 1982 149603.9 1 0 28 1 0 141718.3
SAF 560 1983 156497 1 0 29 1 0 149603.9
SAF 560 1984 193019.2 1 0 30 1 1 156497
SAF 560 1985 197429.3 1 0 31 1 1 193019.2
SAF 560 1986 203169.7 1 0 32 1 1 197429.3
SAF 560 1987 200038.1 1 0 33 1 1 203169.7
SAF 560 1988 208840.8 1 0 34 1 1 200038.1
SAF 560 1989 208980.3 1 0 35 1 1 208840.8
SAF 560 1990 205838.8 1 0 36 1 1 208980.3
SAF 560 1991 212413.6 1 0 37 1 1 205838.8
SAF 560 1992 202857.7 1 0 38 1 1 212413.6
SAF 560 1993 219542.3 1 0 39 1 1 202857.7
SAF 560 1994 230665.5 1 0 40 1 1 219542.3
SAF 560 1995 219734.2 1 0 41 1 1 230665.5
SAF 560 1996 209427.4 1 0 42 1 1 219734.2  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum” and “measdum2” control for changes in the 





Table 12:  War Over the Aouzou Strip 
stateabb ccode year pec level shock time measdum measdum2 measdum3 pec_L1
CHA 483 1966 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 .
CHA 483 1967 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
CHA 483 1968 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
CHA 483 1969 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
CHA 483 1970 189.3702 0 0 5 1 0 0 5
CHA 483 1971 193.8475 0 0 6 1 0 0 189.3702
CHA 483 1972 197.6446 0 0 7 1 0 0 193.8475
CHA 483 1973 202.4337 0 0 8 1 0 0 197.6446
CHA 483 1974 206.2968 0 0 9 1 0 0 202.4337
CHA 483 1975 210.1032 0 0 10 1 0 0 206.2968
CHA 483 1976 214.3441 0 0 11 1 0 0 210.1032
CHA 483 1977 230.6358 0 0 12 1 0 0 214.3441
CHA 483 1978 239.0925 0 0 13 1 0 0 230.6358
CHA 483 1979 239.0074 0 0 14 1 0 0 239.0925
CHA 483 1980 242.8177 0 0 15 1 0 0 239.0074
CHA 483 1981 254.2995 0 0 16 1 0 0 242.8177
CHA 483 1982 264.2003 0 0 17 1 0 0 254.2995
CHA 483 1983 269.9514 0 0 18 1 0 0 264.2003
CHA 483 1984 266.7263 0 0 19 1 0 0 269.9514
CHA 483 1985 266.5223 0 0 20 1 0 0 266.7263
CHA 483 1986 276.6704 1 1 21 1 0 0 266.5223
CHA 483 1987 290.2118 1 1 22 1 0 0 276.6704
CHA 483 1988 295.7563 1 0 23 1 0 0 290.2118
CHA 483 1989 305.1658 1 0 24 1 0 0 295.7563
CHA 483 1990 1471.284 1 0 25 1 1 0 305.1658
CHA 483 1991 1492.209 1 0 26 1 1 0 1471.284
CHA 483 1992 1533.601 1 0 27 1 1 0 1492.209
CHA 483 1993 1592.616 1 0 28 1 1 0 1533.601
CHA 483 1994 1627.202 1 0 29 1 1 0 1592.616
CHA 483 1995 1657.098 1 0 30 1 1 0 1627.202
CHA 483 1996 1695.366 1 0 31 1 1 0 1657.098
CHA 483 1997 1737.064 1 0 32 1 1 0 1695.366
CHA 483 1998 1781.368 1 0 33 1 1 0 1737.064
CHA 483 1999 1827.348 1 0 34 1 1 0 1781.368
CHA 483 2000 1873.084 1 0 35 1 1 0 1827.348
CHA 483 2001 1909.201 1 0 36 1 1 0 1873.084
CHA 483 2002 1945.959 1 0 37 1 1 0 1909.201
CHA 483 2003 2084.698 1 0 38 1 1 1 1945.959
CHA 483 2004 2114.753 1 0 39 1 1 1 2084.698
CHA 483 2005 2160.812 1 0 40 1 1 1 2114.753
CHA 483 2006 2195.95 1 0 41 1 1 1 2160.812
CHA 483 2007 2216.756 1 0 42 1 1 1 2195.95  
Note: The energy consumption variable is labelled “pec,” for “primary energy consumption.”  
The lag variable is labelled “pec_L1.”  “Measdum,” “measdum2,” and “measdum3” control for 
















Figure 1:  Cenepa Valley War, Ecuador energy consumption 1975-2007 








Figure 2:  Falkland Islands War, Argentina energy consumption 1962-2002 







Figure 3:  First Russo-Turkish War, Russia energy consumption 1816-1849 







Figure 4:  Football War, El Salvador energy consumption 1949-1989 







Figure 5:  Mexican-American War, USA energy consumption 1826-1867 







Figure 6:  Second Ogaden War, Phase 2, Somalia energy consumption 1977-1978 







Figure 7:  Second Russo-Turkish War, Russia energy consumption 1857-1898 







Figure 8:  Turco-Cypriot War, Turkey energy consumption 1954-1994 







Figure 9:  Ugandan-Tanzanian War, Uganda energy consumption 1962-1999 







Figure 10:  War Over Angola, South Africa energy consumption 1955-1996 







Figure 11:  War Over the Aouzou Strip, Chad energy consumption 1986-1987 
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